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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Alfredo Semper appeals from the order of the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands granting the motion to 
dismiss filed by Defendants Curtis V. Gomez and the United 
 3 
States of America.  We will affirm the District Court‘s order 
insofar as it dismissed Semper‘s official capacity claim 
against Chief Judge Gomez, his claim against the United 
States, and his claim for a writ of mandamus for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Furthermore, we will remand this 
matter to the District Court with instructions to dismiss his 
individual capacity claim against Chief Judge Gomez for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. 
  
I. 
 
On July 3, 2010, Luis Roldan, a pretrial releasee under 
the supervision of the Probation Office of the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands, was found murdered.  At the time, 
Semper was employed by the District Court as a probation 
officer, a position he had held since 2001.  His employment 
was terminated on August 8, 2010, purportedly on the 
grounds that he was the probation officer assigned to 
supervise the releasee and ―was ‗extremely negligent in the 
supervision of Mr. Roldan.‘‖  (A26.)  According to Semper, 
he was not given a hearing before his termination and, 
―[o]ther than the conclusory statements set forth above, 
plaintiff was not informed of any facts that supported his 
termination.‖  (Id.)  Semper claimed that, had he been given a 
hearing, he would have shown that he was not negligent in his 
duties because he was not the probation officer assigned to 
supervise Roldan.  Then-Chief Judge Curtis V. Gomez 
allegedly made the final decision to terminate Semper‘s 
employment. 
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 Semper filed an action pursuant to the Tucker Act 
against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims.  
Seeking reinstatement and back pay, he alleged that he was 
terminated without cause and without a pre-termination 
hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3602.  Section 3602(a) provides 
that ―[a] district court of the United States shall appoint 
qualified persons to serve, with or without compensation, as 
probation officers within the jurisdiction and under the 
direction of the court making the appointment.‖  In turn, 
―[t]he court may, for cause, remove a probation officer 
appointed to serve with compensation, and may, in its 
discretion remove a probation officer appointed to serve 
without compensation.‖  18 U.S.C. § 3602(a). 
 
 The government moved to dismiss Semper‘s action on 
jurisdictional grounds.  According to the government, Semper 
was classified as a member of the so-called excepted service 
under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (―CSRA‖), and, 
in turn, he was not among those excepted service employees 
eligible under this statutory scheme for judicial or 
administrative review of adverse agency actions.  ―Because 
the CSRA governs the procedural rights of members of both 
the competitive service and the excepted service, the 
government argued that Congress‘s decision to deny any right 
to administrative or judicial review to persons such as Mr. 
Semper for actions such as termination foreclosed him from 
obtaining review of his termination in other forums, such as 
the Court of Federal Claims.‖  Semper v. United States, 694 
F.3d 90, 91 (Fed. Cir. 2012).   
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 Although it granted the government‘s motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of 
Federal Claims actually disagreed with the government‘s 
CSRA theory.  Semper v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 621, 
622-38 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2011).  As the Federal Circuit 
subsequently explained, the Court of Federal Claims ―found 
that because Mr. Semper was employed in the Judicial 
Branch, the CSRA did not apply to him and therefore did not 
have the effect of foreclosing his access to judicial or 
administrative remedies.‖  Semper, 694 F.3d at 92.  The 
Court of Federal Claims nevertheless concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction over Semper‘s action because he failed to set 
forth a money-mandating statute or regulation—or a 
―network‖ of such statutes and regulations—giving him the 
right to contest his termination in a Tucker Act proceeding.  
Semper, 100 Fed. Cl. at 633-38.  In reaching this conclusion, 
it noted that the District Court of the Virgin Islands had not 
adopted the ―Model Adverse Action Procedure for Removal 
of a Probation Officer‖ developed by the Judicial Conference 
of the United States.  Id. at 637.  Nevertheless, the District 
Court did adopt the ―Equal Employment Opportunity and 
Employment Dispute Resolution Plan‖ (or the ―Consolidated 
Model Plan‖).  Id.  This remedial plan was proposed by the 
Third Circuit Judicial Council (and, in turn, was based on the 
Model Equal Employment Opportunity Plan prepared by the 
Judicial Conference in 1980 as well as the Judicial 
Conference‘s 1997 Model Employment Dispute Resolution 
Plan).  According to the Court of Federal Claims, the 
Consolidated Model Plan does not apply to Semper‘s case 
because it only covers ―equal employment opportunity and 
anti-discrimination rights.‖  Id. (citing Consolidated Model 
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Plan).  Nevertheless, the Court of Federal Claims stated that 
the failure of the District Court to adopt the applicable model 
procedures does not furnish Semper a cause of action in either 
the Court of Federal Claims or in any other federal court.  Id. 
at 638.  ―In sum, none of the three statutes, the constitutional 
provision, or plaintiff‘s network theory on which plaintiff 
attempts to rely, provide jurisdiction for this court to review 
plaintiff‘s claims.‖  Id. 
 
Semper appealed, but the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of his action based ―on the reasoning originally 
advanced by the government below:  that because Mr. 
Semper is a member of the excepted service, the CSRA 
forecloses his right to seek review of his termination in the 
Court of Federal Claims.‖  Semper, 694 F.3d at 92.  Relying 
in particular on the Supreme Court‘s ruling in United States v. 
Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988), the Federal Circuit determined 
that ―the CSRA ‗was meant to preclude judicial review‘ of 
adverse agency actions by employees in Mr. Semper‘s 
position, rather than ‗merely to leave them free to pursue the 
remedies that had been available before enactment of the 
CSRA,‘‖ Semper, 694 F.3d at 96 (quoting Fausto, 484 U.S. at 
443-44).  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit expressly rejected 
Semper‘s theory that the CSRA and the holding of Fausto do 
not extend to employees of the Judicial Branch.  Id. at 94-96.  
Citing to our own opinion in Mitchum v. Hurt, 73 F.3d 30 (3d 
Cir. 1995), together with a number of other rulings, the 
Federal Circuit went on to explain that it expressed no 
opinion as to whether Semper could pursue a due process 
claim in a district court action: 
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 At oral argument, the question was 
raised whether Mr. Semper could litigate his 
due process claim in a district court action, 
either in an action for damages under the Bivens 
doctrine (see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, [403 U.S. 
388 (1971)]), or by seeking reinstatement, or 
both.  We do not address that issue other than to 
note that it has been presented to a number of 
circuits, which have expressed varying views on 
the issue.  See Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 
180 (2d Cir. 2005); [Mitchum, 73 F.3d at 36]; 
Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 842-43 
(9th Cir. 1991); Lombardi v. Small Bus. 
Admin., 889 F.2d 959, 961-62 (10th Cir. 1989); 
Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1, 11 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) see generally Elgin v. Dep‘t of the 
Treasury, [132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012)]); Schweiker 
v. Chilicky, [487 U.S. 412 (1988)]; Bush v. 
Lucas, [462 U.S. 367 (1983)].   Mr. Semper has 
informed us that if he is not successful in 
obtaining review of his dismissal by the Court 
of Federal Claims, he will pursue his due 
process claim in a district court action. 
 
Semper, 694 F.3d at 96. 
 
 Semper filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which 
was denied.  See Semper v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1583 
(2013). 
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 Semper filed the current action in the District Court, 
claiming that the District Court possessed federal question 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Alleging that he 
was denied a pre-termination hearing and terminated without 
cause in violation of the Due Process Clause and § 3602, 
Semper set forth the following four counts in his amended 
complaint:  (1) a Bivens claim against Chief Judge Gomez in 
his individual capacity; (2) a claim against Chief Judge 
Gomez in his official capacity; (3) a claim against the United 
States pursuant to the waiver of sovereign immunity 
contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (―APA‖); and 
(4) a claim under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, 
against Chief Judge Gomez.  He specifically requested 
injunctive relief in the form of an order directing Chief Judge 
Gomez to reinstate him to his position as a probation officer 
and to correct his personnel file to reflect that he was 
discharged without cause as well as back pay.  He also sought 
a declaration to the effect that his termination was without 
cause and violated § 3602 together with an award of 
reasonable attorneys fees.  Chief Judge Gomez and the 
government moved to dismiss Count One for failure to state a 
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 
Counts Two, Three, and Four for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1). 
 
The District Court granted Appellees‘ motion to 
dismiss.  See Semper v. Gomez, Civil Action No. 12-79, 2013 
WL 2451711 (D.V.I. June 4, 2013).  As to Count One, the 
District Court concluded that, even if a former judicial 
employee‘s Bivens action for equitable relief could be 
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considered viable in certain circumstances, a chief judge 
acting in his or her individual capacity lacks the authority to 
reinstate a probation officer because such a step constitutes an 
official governmental act.  It applied the same line of 
reasoning to his request for declaratory relief, i.e., ―[t]here is 
no basis for declaratory relief against a person when it would 
be meaningless.‖  Id.  According to the District Court, it also 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus 
under the Mandamus Act because that statute only applies to 
officials in the Executive Branch. 
 
The District Court agreed with Appellees that Counts 
Two and Three must be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  While ―[t]he [APA], 5 U.S.C. § 702, waives the 
immunity of certain government agencies and federal officials 
where a party seeks relief other than money damages,‖ § 701 
―excludes ‗the courts of the United States‘ from the definition 
of an ‗agency.‘‖  Id. at *3-*4.  According to the District 
Court, it was not required to decide whether the District Court 
of the Virgin islands constitutes a court of the United States 
for purposes of this APA exclusion because, ―[i]f it is not, it 
then clearly fits under another exclusion from the definition 
of an agency—specifically the exclusion of ‗the governments 
of the territories or possessions of the United States‘ of which 
it is a part.‖  Id. at *4.  Having found that the APA‘s limited 
waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply to either the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands or its Chief Judge sued in 
his official capacity for injunctive or declaratory relief, ―[t]he 
question remains as to whether the Chief Judge may be sued 
in his official capacity for injunctive or declaratory relief, 
notwithstanding the language of the APA.‖  Id.  Answering 
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this question in the negative, the District Court distinguished 
our ruling in Mitchum, which purportedly allowed several 
current and former employees of the Veterans Administration 
Medical Center (―VAMC‖) to pursue First Amendment 
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the 
administrator of the VAMC.  According to the District Court, 
Mitchum did not involve a Judicial Branch employee, did not 
cite any cases involving such an employee or a request for 
injunctive relief against a judge or some other official of the 
Judicial Branch, and did not discuss the APA‘s distinction 
between executive agencies and the courts of the United 
States (as well as governments of the territories).  ―As 
Mitchum acknowledged, ‗Congress may restrict the 
availability of injunctive relief,‘‖ id. at *5 (quoting Mitchum, 
73 F.3d at 35), and, according to the District Court, it did so 
in this case:  ―The comprehensive scheme under the CSRA, 
coupled with the exclusion of ‗other than money relief‘ 
against the District Court of the Virgin Islands under § 701 of 
the APA precludes in our view the equitable and declaratory 
relief plaintiff seeks here as a former judicial branch 
employee.‖  Id. 
 
The District Court also observed that ―[t]he lack of 
remedy for plaintiff, a former judicial branch employee under 
Bivens or under any statute must be understood in context.‖  
Id. at *6.  It explained that: 
 
The judiciary has developed its own 
mechanisms to deal with employment issues in 
the absence of these other remedies.  Since 
1996 it has been the policy of the federal 
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judiciary through the Judicial Conference of the 
United States ―to follow the equal employment 
opportunity principles applicable to the private 
sector and government employers.‖  Dotson, 
398 F.3d at 172.  The Virgin Islands has in 
place a ―Consolidated Equal Employment 
Opportunity and Employment Dispute 
Resolution Plan.‖  The Plan is based on the 
Model Equal Employment Opportunity Plan 
adopted by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States in March 1980 and also includes 
elements of the Model Employment Dispute 
Resolution Plan adopted in March 2010.  The 
Plan provides procedures for dealing with 
―workplace and employment issues‖ including 
not only those involving discrimination but also 
―personnel practices.‖  Probation officers, 
among other judicial employees, are protected.  
Violations by judges as well as other court 
employees are covered.  If there is an allegation 
against a judge, the duties under the Plan shall 
be performed by the Third Circuit Judicial 
Council.  The Plan provides the employee with 
due process rights and allows the right to 
counsel.  There is a prohibition against 
retaliation.  Although payment of attorneys‘ 
fees (except as authorized under the Back Pay 
Act), compensatory damages, and punitive 
damages are not available, an employee is 
entitled to back pay under certain circumstances 
and to various forms of equitable relief 
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including ―reinstatement to a position from 
which previously removed.‖  The decision of 
the Judicial Council will be final. 
 
 The record does not reveal whether 
plaintiff has made any attempt to seek relief 
under this court‘s Plan. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted).  In a footnote, the District Court 
pointed out that ―[t]he probation officer in Dotson sued not 
only for race discrimination, but as the plaintiff here, for 
violation of due process.‖1  Id. at *6 n.6. 
 
II. 
 
Alleging that his due process rights were violated, 
Semper filed a federal question action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
seeking equitable and declaratory relief against Chief Judge 
                                                 
 
1
 Before the parties commenced briefing 
Semper‘s appeal from the District Court‘s ruling, Judge 
Wilma A. Lewis was appointed the Chief Judge of the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands. 
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Gomez and the United States.
2
  Nevertheless, we conclude 
that the CSRA precludes Semper‘s constitutional claims for 
equitable and declaratory relief because he was a judicial 
employee who could pursue meaningful relief under a 
remedial plan adopted by the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands that provides for meaningful review of his claims by 
judicial officers.  Accordingly, the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over his claims.  In addition, the 
District Court did not commit reversible error by dismissing 
Semper‘s mandamus claim on jurisdictional grounds. 
 
A. Semper’s Constitutional Claims for Equitable and 
Declaratory Relief 
 
 1. The CSRA and Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
―The portion of the CSRA that is codified in Chapter 
75 of Title 5 of the United States Code details the procedural 
protections afforded to government employees who are 
subjected to certain adverse personnel actions.‖  Semper, 694 
                                                 
 
2
  Section 1331 provides that ―[t]he district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.‖  The District Court of the Virgin Islands, in turn, 
possesses ―the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United 
States.‖  48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).  This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Questions of 
subject matter jurisdiction raised on a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(1) are reviewed under a de novo standard.  See, 
e.g., Baer v. United States, 722 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2013).    
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F.3d at 92 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543).  As the Federal 
Circuit observed, this statutory scheme provides for 
administrative review by the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(―MSPB‖), followed by judicial review by the Federal Circuit 
itself.  Id.  The CSRA further ―provides that those procedures 
are available only to ‗employees,‘ a term that excludes 
members of the excepted service who do not satisfy particular 
eligibility or tenure requirements, and it further excludes 
certain categories of ‗employees‘ from entitlement to the 
review procedures.‖  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 
7511(b)).  ―Mr. Semper was in the excepted service, not the 
competitive service,‖ was not preference eligible, was not 
serving a probationary or trial period pending conversion to 
the competitive service, and, although he had competed two 
years of continuous service, ―his service was in the Judicial 
Branch and not in a position in an Executive Branch agency.‖  
Id. at 92-93.  Accordingly, ―Mr. Semper does not fall within 
the statutory definition of an ‗employee‘ and therefore is not 
entitled to the administrative and judicial review procedures 
prescribed by the CSRA.‖  Id. at 93.   
 
Semper sought to bypass the CSRA by bringing suit in 
the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act.  In United 
States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988), a non-preference 
eligible excepted service member in the Executive Branch 
employed a similar strategy, filing suit in the Claims Court 
because he was precluded from seeking administrative review 
under the CSRA.  Fausto, an excepted service employee of 
the Fish and Wildlife Service (who, at that time, did not have 
a right to administrative or judicial review under the CSRA), 
filed a Claims Court action under the Back Pay and Tucker 
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Acts challenging his 30-day suspension for unauthorized use 
of a government vehicle.  Fausto, 484 U.S. at 440-43.  
According to the Supreme Court, ―[t]he comprehensive 
nature of the CSRA, the attention that it gives throughout to 
the rights of nonpreference excepted service employees, and 
the fact that it does not include them in provisions for 
administrative and judicial review contained in Chapter 75, 
combine to establish a congressional judgment that those 
employees should not be able to demand judicial review for 
the type of personnel action covered by that chapter.‖  Id. at 
448.  As the Supreme Court subsequently explained in Elgin 
v. Department of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012), the 
Fausto Court ―found it ‗fairly discernible‘ that Congress 
intended to preclude all judicial review of Fausto‘s statutory 
claims,‖ id. at 2133 (footnote omitted) (quoting Fausto, 484 
U.S. at 452).  ―Just as the CSRA‘s ‗elaborate‘ framework, 
[Fausto, 484 U.S. at 443], demonstrates Congress‘s intent to 
entirely foreclose judicial review to employees to whom the 
CSRA denies statutory review, it similarly indicates that 
extrastatutory review is not available to those employees to 
whom the CSRA grants administrative and judicial review.‖  
Id.  Applying Fausto to the Judicial Branch, the Federal 
Circuit determined that ―Congress‘s decision not to afford 
persons in Mr. Semper‘s position any right of administrative 
or judicial review under the CSRA forecloses him from 
obtaining judicial review of his termination by an alternative 
mechanism, i.e., through an action in the Court of Federal 
Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491.‖  Semper, 
694 F.3d at 93. 
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Even before its decision in Fausto, the Supreme Court 
refused to allow a NASA employee who had allegedly been 
suspended for whistle-blowing (and who had a right to review 
under pre-CSRA law and actually had obtained reinstatement 
with back pay through this process) to pursue a Bivens action 
for damages against his supervisor for retaliation in violation 
of the First Amendment.  Bush, 462 U.S. at 368-90.  In Bush 
v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the Court observed that a 
proposed Bivens action could be defeated where there are 
―‗special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress,‘‖ id. at 377 (quoting Carlson 
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980)).  ―Because [Bush‘s] 
claims arise out of an employment relationship that is 
governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive 
provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United 
States, we conclude that it would be inappropriate for us to 
supplement the regulatory scheme with a new judicial 
remedy.‖  Id. at 368.  The Bush Court reached this conclusion 
even though the civil service remedies were not as effective 
as a judicial award of damages would be and did not fully 
compensate the employee for the harm he suffered, e.g., his 
attorney‘s fees were not paid by the government.  See, e.g., 
id. at 372 & n.9; see also, e.g., Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 414-29 
(refusing to recognize non-statutory damages claim for 
unconstitutional denial Social Security disability benefits). 
 
At this time, it is undisputed that the CSRA precludes 
current or former federal employees from bringing a Bivens 
damages action for alleged constitutional violations arising 
out of the employment context.  In fact, the Second, Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that current or former 
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employees of the Judicial Branch—who otherwise have no 
right to administrative or judicial review under the CSRA 
itself—could not bring damages claims pursuant to the 
Bivens doctrine.  Dotson, 398 F.3d at 159-83; Blankenship v. 
McDonald, 176 F.3d 1192, 1194-96 (9th Cir. 1999); Lee v. 
Hughes, 145 F.3d 1272, 1273-77 (11th Cir. 1998).  As we 
explained in Sarullo v. USPS, 352 F.3d 789, 795 (3d Cir. 
2003) (per curiam), ―[w]e held [in Mitchum] that the CSRA 
affords the exclusive remedy for damage claims of federal 
employees seeking redress for alleged constitutional 
violations arising out of the employment relationship,‖ id. at 
795.  We then determined in Sarullo that ―the District Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Sarullo‘s Bivens 
claim [of malicious prosecution following an investigation 
into whether he was selling drugs to other postal employees 
inside the post office] as such a claim was barred by the 
comprehensive statutory scheme provided in the CSRA, and 
should have dismissed the Bivens claim for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.‖  Id. at 797. 
 
2. Mitchum and Elgin    
 
Based on these legal principles, this Court now must 
decide the question that the Federal Circuit itself refused to 
resolve, i.e., whether or not Semper ―could litigate a due 
process claim‖ for equitable and declaratory relief ―in a 
district court action‖ filed pursuant to § 1331.  Semper, 694 
F.3d at 96.  In addressing this rather complex question, we 
begin with our opinion in Mitchum. 
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In Mitchum, three current or former employees of the 
Pittsburgh VAMC filed a § 1331 action ―against VAMC 
administrators [for equitable and declaratory relief], claiming 
among other things, that the administrators had violated the 
employees‘ First Amendment rights by retaliating against 
them for making statements intended to secure improvements 
for VAMC patients.‖  Mitchum, 73 F.3d at 31.  The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
on the basis that ―the plaintiffs could not assert such claims in 
federal court but were instead required to pursue available 
administrative remedies.‖  Id.  ―Because Bush and the other 
Supreme Court decisions on which the defendants rely 
concern the recognition of non-statutory damages remedies 
rather than injunctive and declaratory relief,‖ this Court (in an 
opinion by then-Judge Alito) reversed.  Id. 
 
We noted that ―all three appellants could have pursued 
administrative remedies to vindicate the alleged violations of 
their First Amendment rights.‖3  Id.  Based on our discussion 
                                                 
3
 Specifically, one plaintiff (Krumholz, the Staff 
Assistant to the Associate Director) enjoyed the protections of 
the CSRA itself, which allowed him to file an allegation of a 
prohibited personnel practice with the MSPB‘s Office of 
Special Counsel (―OSC‖) and to obtain review by the MSPB.  
Id. at 31-32.  ―A final order or decision is subject to judicial 
review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.‖  Id. at 32 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(h), 7703(b)).  
Krumholz initially filed an administrative complaint under 
this CSRA process, but it was dismissed because he had 
already commenced his action in the district court.  Id. at 32 
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of Fausto, Schweiker, and especially Bush, we admitted that 
―a good argument can be made that a federal employee who 
has meaningful administrative remedies and a right to judicial 
review under the CSRA or another comparable statutory 
scheme should not be permitted to bypass that scheme by 
bringing an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and seeking 
injunctive or declaratory relief.‖  Id. at 34.  ―Several courts of 
appeals have so held, and these have much to recommend 
them.  See, e.g, [Saul, 928 F.2d at 843]; Stephens v. Dep‘t of 
Health and Human Services, 901 F.2d 1571, 1575-77 (11th 
Cir. 1990); [Lombardi, 889 F.2d at 926].‖  Mitchum, 73 F.3d 
                                                                                                             
n.2.  The other two plaintiffs (Mitchum, the former Chief of 
Medical Services, and Webb, Assistant Chief Nurse for 
Special Projects) were subject to a different statutory scheme 
(and neither the parties nor this Court expressed any opinion 
as to whether their grievances could have been presented to 
an appeals board and then to the Federal Circuit under this 
scheme or whether their claims had to be pursued through 
internal administrative channels or pursuant to a collective 
bargaining agreement).  Id. at 32 & n.3.  The Mitchum 
plaintiffs sought various kinds of injunctive and declaratory 
relief from the district court, ―including an order directing the 
defendants to cease and desist from retaliation, harassment, 
and reprisal; an order directing the removal of certain 
documents from the plaintiffs‘ files; and an order directing 
the appointment of a permanent community-based board of 
overseers to monitor the operations of the facility.‖  Id. at 33.  
―Webb and Krumholz also sought reinstatement to their prior 
positions.‖  Id. 
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at 34 (footnote omitted).  In two other instances, the 
respective circuit courts either reserved judgment or found 
that a party could not obtain injunctive relief for minor 
personnel actions.  Id. at 34 n.5 (citing Bryant v. Cheney, 924 
F.2d 525, 528 (4th Cir. 1991); Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899 
(4th Cir. 1984)). 
  
However, the D.C. Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion in a case filed by an unsuccessful job applicant 
who claimed he had been rejected due to his First 
Amendment activities.  Id. at 34.  The original panel in 
Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1 (D.C Cir. 1986), ―held that Bush 
defeated the applicant‘s Bivens claim for damages but 
permitted him to seek the equitable remedy of 
reinstatement.‘‖  Mitchum, 73 F.3d at 35 (quoting Hubbard, 
809 F.2d at 11).  The full D.C. Circuit reaffirmed the panel‘s 
decision on the damages claim and (while it did not rehear the 
reinstatement claim) indicated that equitable relief was 
appropriate.  Id. (discussing Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 
223 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam)). 
  
 Although with some reluctance, we followed the D.C. 
Circuit‘s approach: 
 
On balance, we think that the District of 
Columbia Circuit has taken the better course.  
The power of the federal courts to grant 
equitable relief for constitutional violations has 
long been established.  See, e.g., Osborn v. 
United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 838-46, 859, 
6 L. Ed. 204 (1824); Ex parte Young, [209 U.S. 
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123, 156 (1908)].  Thus, as the District of 
Columbia Circuit observed, there is a 
―‗presumed availability of federal equitable 
relief against threatened invasions of 
constitutional interests.‘‖  Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 
11 (quoting [Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404] (Harlan, 
J., concurring in the judgment)).  It is 
reasonable to assume that Congress legislates 
with the understanding that this form of judicial 
relief is generally available to protect 
constitutional rights.  While Congress may 
restrict the availability of injunctive relief (see, 
e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 2283; 26 U.S.C. § 
7421(a)), we believe that we should be very 
hesitant before concluding that Congress has 
impliedly imposed such a restriction on the 
authority to award injunctive relief to vindicate 
constitutional rights. 
 
Id.  We acknowledged that the Bush Court found that the 
history and structure of the CSRA was sufficiently clear to 
preclude the creation of a new Bivens claim.  Id.  ―But the 
Supreme Court has developed a special jurisprudence for 
Bivens claims, and we are hesitant to extend this 
jurisprudence into other spheres.‖  Id.  In other words, ―it 
does not necessarily follow that the long-recognized 
availability of injunctive relief should be restricted‖ merely 
―because ‗special factors counseling hesitation‘ militate 
against the creation of a new non-statutory damages remedy.‖  
Id.  While ―[w]e assume that the power of the federal courts 
to award legal and equitable relief in actions under 28 U.S.C. 
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§ 1331 stems from the same source, see Bush, [462 U.S. at 
374],‖ this ―does not mean that the factors that counsel 
against one type of relief are equally applicable with respect 
to the other.‖  Mitchum, 73 F.2d at 35-36 (citing Bivens, 403 
U.S. at 405-06 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies:  The Constitution as A 
Sword, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1543 (1972)). 
 
 Accordingly, we recognized the Supreme Court‘s 
reluctance to create non-statutory damages remedies for 
federal employees subject to adverse employment actions, a 
reluctance manifested in Bush, Fausto, and Schweiker.  But 
we observed an important distinction:  whereas Bivens claims 
were a ―‗recent judicial creation‘‖ easily preempted by 
Congress, ―[t]he power of the federal courts to grant equitable 
relief for constitutional violations‖ had much deeper roots.  
Id. at 35 (quoting Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 11 n.15).  Because of 
the ―‗―presumed availability‖‘‖ of equitable relief—a 
presumption of which we assumed Congress to be aware—we 
declined to interpret the CSRA to impliedly curtail our 
authority to grant such relief.  Id. (quoting Hubbard, 809 F.2d 
at 11).  To hold otherwise would be ―a big and important 
jump‖ that we were hesitant to make ―[w]ithout more specific 
guidance from the Supreme Court.‖  Id. at 36.  Although not 
directly on point because it involved executive rather than 
judicial employees, Mitchum stands for the broader 
proposition that we should be leery to restrict a federal court‘s 
ability to grant equitable relief in order to vindicate a 
constitutional right. 
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 Semper unsurprisingly relies on our Mitchum opinion, 
and, at least when viewed in isolation, it does seem to weigh 
in his favor.  After all, we allowed the plaintiffs‘ 
constitutional claims for equitable and declaratory relief to go 
forward even though they ―could have pursued administrative 
remedies to vindicate the alleged violations of their First 
Amendment rights.‖  Id. at 31.  We likewise rejected the 
theory—adopted by several other circuit courts—that ―a 
federal employee who has meaningful administrative 
remedies and a right to judicial review under the CSRA or 
another comparable statutory scheme should not be permitted 
to bypass that scheme by bringing an action under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.‖  Id. at 
34. 
 
 Nevertheless, both the District Court and Appellees 
point out that the Mitchum opinion did not involve an 
employee of the Judicial Branch.  At the very least, it is 
atypical for a court to hear a § 1331 action filed by one of its 
own employees asking the court to enter an injunction against 
its own chief judge requiring him or her to reinstate this 
former employee because the termination violated the 
Constitution.  In contrast, there is a long-standing tradition of 
federal courts granting equitable relief against federal 
executive officials to vindicate the constitutional rights of the 
plaintiffs.  Following the example set by the D.C. Circuit, we 
discussed this extensive history of the judiciary enjoining 
unconstitutional executive actions in Mitchum.  See, e.g., id. 
at 35. 
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Likewise, Congress has indicated on a number of 
occasions that employment disputes within the Judicial 
Branch implicate a special set of circumstances, including the 
doctrine of separation of powers and the protection of an 
independent judiciary.  As the Federal Circuit noted, 
Congress responded to Fausto by amending the CSRA to 
extend review rights to certain excepted service employees in 
the Executive Branch—but not the Judicial Branch.  Semper, 
694 F.3d at 95.  It also enacted the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts Personnel Act of 1990 so as to close 
―a loophole in the statutory scheme‖ that had granted CSRA 
review rights to certain employees of the Administrative 
Office.  Id. (citation omitted); see also Dotson, 398 F.3d at 
171.  Congress allowed the Administrative Office to create a 
personnel system ―‗free from executive branch controls and 
more similar to that of the rest of the judicial branch‘‖ 
because ―‗Executive Branch oversight of its personnel 
activities was deemed ‗contrary to the doctrine of separation 
of powers.‘‖  Semper, 694 F.3d at 95 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
101-770(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1709, 
1710).  Furthermore, Congress ultimately decided not to 
include judicial employees under the Congressional 
Accountability Act of 1995 (which extended the protections 
of various labor laws to legislative employees and created a 
process by such employees could obtain relief from 
Congress‘s Office of Compliance and then the judiciary) due 
to concerns about judicial independence.  See Dotson, 398 
F.3d at 173-75 (footnote omitted).  Ordered to make a report 
to Congress, the Judicial Conference emphasized the 
importance of an internal governance system to maintaining 
an independent Judicial Branch.  Id. at 175.  Evidently 
 25 
satisfied by the judiciary‘s history of handling personnel 
complaints through its own administrative review procedures 
and its proposal to revise the Judicial Conference‘s model 
equal employment opportunity plan, Congress took no further 
action.  Id. at 174.  Finally, the District Court noted that the 
APA, although it expressly allows for injured persons to bring 
non-damage claims with respect to the misconduct of federal 
agencies and their officers, excludes ―the courts of the United 
States‖ (as well as the territorial governments) from its 
definition of an ―agency.‖  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-702. 
 
Admittedly, these various considerations by 
themselves may not be sufficient to distinguish Mitchum.  
After all, courts and judges—like executive agencies and their 
officials—are bound by the Constitution.  In fact, given their 
critical role in interpreting the Constitution and vindicating 
constitutional rights, they should be held to the highest 
standards.  In Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2005), 
the Second Circuit ultimately concluded that a former 
probation officer—who alleged unconstitutional race 
discrimination  as well as the denial of due process in 
connection with his termination—could not pursue a district 
court action for either damages or for equitable relief, id. at 
159-83.  But it did so with some reluctance, specifically 
stating that it was ―mindful that it may appear, at first glance, 
to exempt the judiciary from any judicial review of its own 
employment actions, even with respect to charges of 
discrimination.‖  Id. at 160.  Nevertheless, there is more to the 
current appeal than our prior ruling in Mitchum or the various 
circumstances implicated by judicial employment disputes. 
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In its 2012 decision in Elgin, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether former federal employees fired because 
they failed to register with the Selective Service (and who 
were competitive service employees with the rights under the 
CSRA to a hearing before the MPSB as well to file a petition 
for review with the Federal Circuit) could pursue equitable 
claims challenging the facial unconstitutionality of Selective 
Service legislation.  Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2130-40.  One of the 
plaintiffs (Elgin) appealed his removal to the MSPB, but the 
ALJ dismissed this appeal on the grounds that an employee is 
not entitled to MSPB review of agency action based on an 
absolute statutory bar to employment and that the MSPB 
otherwise lacks the jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality 
of a federal statute.  Id. at 2131. 
 
According to the plaintiffs, the general grant of federal 
question jurisdiction under § 1331, which gives district courts 
jurisdiction over constitutional claims, remains undisturbed 
unless Congress explicitly states otherwise.  Id. at 2132.  
They specifically ―rely on Webster v. Doe, [486 U.S. 592 
(1977)], which held that ‗where Congress intends to preclude 
judicial review of constitutional claims [,] its intent to do so 
must be clear.‘‖  Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Webster, 
486 U.S. at 603).  This ―‗heightened showing‘ was required to 
‗avoid the ―serious constitutional question‖ that would arise if 
a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum 
for a colorable constitutional claim.‘‖  Id. (quoting Webster, 
486 U.S. at 603).  The Elgin Court explained that, ―[a]lthough 
Fausto interpreted the CSRA to entirely foreclose judicial 
review, the Court had no need to apply a heightened standard 
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like that applied in [Webster] because Fausto did not press 
any constitutional claims.‖  Id. at 2133 n.4. 
 
Although constitutional claims were alleged by the 
Elgin plaintiffs, the Supreme Court refused to apply the 
heightened Webster standard because ―the CSRA does not 
foreclose all judicial review of petitioners‘ constitutional 
claims, but merely directs that judicial review shall occur in 
the Federal Circuit,‖ which ―is fully capable of providing 
meaningful review of petitioners‘ claims.‖  Id. at 2132 
(citation omitted).  The Supreme Court accordingly held that 
―the CSRA provides the exclusive avenue to judicial review 
when a qualifying employee challenges an adverse 
employment action by arguing that a federal statute is 
unconstitutional.‖  Id. at 2130; see also, e.g., id. at 2140 (―For 
the foregoing reasons, we conclude that it is fairly discernible 
that the CSRA review scheme was intended to preclude 
district court jurisdiction over petitioner‘s claims.‖).  It was 
uncontested that the MSPB routinely adjudicates a variety of 
constitutional claims (including claims that an adverse agency 
action violated an employee‘s First or Fourth Amendment 
rights), and the Elgin plaintiffs admitted that such claims 
must be brought under the CSRA process.  See, e.g., id. at 
2134.  In turn, the CSRA scheme allowed for meaningful 
review of facial constitutional challenges because the 
plaintiffs ―are covered employees challenging a covered 
employment action,‖ the Federal Circuit has the ―authority to 
consider and decide petitioners‘ constitutional claims,‖ and, 
insofar as such challenges may require factual development, 
―the CSRA equips the MSPB with tools to create the 
necessary record.‖  Id. at 2139.   
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 The Supreme Court‘s decision in Elgin provides the 
―more specific guidance‖ we sought in Mitchum.  The Elgin 
Court held that the ―‗elaborate‘ framework‖ of the CSRA was 
exclusive, ―demonstrat[ing] Congress‘ intent to entirely 
foreclose judicial review to employees to whom the CSRA 
denies statutory review . . . [as well as] those employees to 
whom the CSRA grants administrative and judicial review.‖  
Id. at 2133 (quoting Fausto, 484 U.S. at 443).  In light of the 
CSRA‘s purpose to create an ―‗integrated scheme of 
administrative and judicial review,‘‖ and bring uniformity in 
decision-making to federal employment disputes, it followed 
that ―the statutory review scheme is exclusive, even for 
employees who bring constitutional challenges to federal 
statutes.‖  Id. at 2135 (quoting Fausto, 484 U.S. at 444-45).  
Thus, in concluding that the CSRA precluded district court 
jurisdiction over the petitioners‘ constitutional claims for 
equitable relief, Elgin effectively overruled Mitchum insofar 
as that decision had allowed plaintiffs who ―could have 
pursued administrative remedies to vindicate the alleged 
violations of their First Amendment rights‖ to seek equitable 
relief in district court.  Mitchum, 73 F.3d at 31; see also id. at 
34 (hesitantly rejecting argument adopted by other circuits 
that ―a federal employee who has meaningful administrative 
remedies and a right to judicial review under the CSRA or 
another comparable statutory scheme should not be permitted 
to bypass that scheme by bringing an action under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and seeking injunctive or declaratory relief‖). 
 
 We now conclude that the CSRA precludes a federal 
employee from litigating constitutional claims for equitable 
and declaratory relief in a § 1331 action where the employee 
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could pursue meaningful relief under a remedial plan that 
provides for meaningful review of his or her claims by 
judicial officers.  However, a federal employee who could not 
pursue meaningful relief through a remedial plan that 
includes some measure of meaningful judicial review has the 
right to seek equitable and declaratory relief for alleged 
constitutional violations in a ―federal question‖ action filed 
pursuant to § 1331. 
 
We believe that this approach honors both our ruling in 
Mitchum as well as the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Elgin 
(as well as Fausto, Bush, and Webster).  We further observe 
that our ruling today permits an employee to obtain 
meaningful redress for violations of his or her own 
constitutional rights through a process involving meaningful 
review by judicial officers while—at the same time—taking 
into account the special set of circumstances arising out of 
employment disputes between the judiciary and its own 
employees.  As we have already indicated, the Second Circuit 
determined that the CSRA precluded a former probation 
officer‘s constitutional claims for equitable relief.  Dotson, 
398 F.3d at 159-61, 179-83.  In reaching this determination, 
the circuit court emphasized the existence of the federal 
judiciary‘s extensive equal opportunity and employment 
dispute system.  Id. at 159-83.  According to the Dotson 
court, the Judicial Branch has long provided its personnel 
with the opportunity to challenge adverse employment 
decisions and obtain various forms of relief, including 
reinstatement.  See, e.g., id. at 181.  In fact, ―the judiciary has 
itself provided for its employees what can only be afforded 
private employees or employees of other branches of 
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government through legislation:  a measure of judicial review 
for claims of employment discrimination.‖  Id. at 161; see 
also id. at 176 n.14 (―Indeed the judiciary is unique among 
the branches of government in being able to provide for itself 
some review of its administrative employment decisions by a 
judicial officer.  For other branches of government, judicial 
review of administrative employment decisions requires 
legislation.‖).  Congress, especially in conjunction with the 
1995 enactment of the CAA extending labor protections to 
Legislative Branch employees, has monitored and engaged in 
a dialogue with the judiciary to assess whether legislation was 
necessary to protect the rights of Judicial Branch employees.  
Id. at 173-76, 181-82.  ―In this context, Congress‘s decision 
not to act endorses the conclusion that it considered the 
judicial review available to judicial branch employees 
through the judiciary‘s own review plans adequate and 
intended no supplemental judicial review either at law or in 
equity.‖  Id. at 181.  Given such circumstances, we agree with 
the Second Circuit that it would be unnecessary and even 
inappropriate to allow a judicial employee to file a lawsuit 
against a judicial officer where the judiciary has already 
provided a means for this person to obtain meaningful relief 
together with a measure of judicial review.
4
  See, e.g., id. at 
181.   
                                                 
 
4
  We note that the Ninth Circuit followed our 
example in Mitchum to conclude that the statutory scheme 
governing TSA security screeners did not preclude a district 
court action for equitable relief filed by a union and a former 
screener who alleged that the TSA violated the First 
Amendment by disciplining and discharging the screener for 
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 3. The District Court’s Consolidated Model 
Plan 
  
Accordingly, we now must decide whether Semper 
himself could pursue meaningful relief under a remedial plan 
that provides for meaningful review by judicial officers.  We 
ultimately determine that he could do so pursuant to the 
District Court‘s ―Equal Employment Opportunity and 
Employment Dispute Resolution Plan.‖ 
 
 As Appellees (and the District Court) note, the 
Consolidated Model Plan
5—which was drafted by the Third 
Circuit Judicial Council and adopted by the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands—provides for a review process consisting 
of the following stages: counseling, mediation, a ―hearing 
before the chief judge (or his or her designee) of the court in 
which the alleged violation arises,‖ and, finally, ―review of 
                                                                                                             
taking part in union activities.  Am. Fed. Of Gov‘t Employees 
Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027, 1029-32, 1034-39 (9th Cir. 
2007).  In the process, the Ninth Circuit expressly 
distinguished Dotson on the grounds that the former judicial 
employee ―had other remedial mechanisms available.‖  Id. at 
1038 (citing, inter alia, Dotson, 398 F.3d at 181).     
 
5
 Although the Consolidated Model Plan was 
not included in the record on appeal, we note that it was 
discussed by both the Court of Federal Claims and the 
District Court and that Semper himself submitted a copy of 
the document to the Court of Federal Claims.  See, e.g., 
Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 
414, 416 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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the hearing decision under procedures established by the 
judicial council of the circuit.‖  (Appellees‘ Addendum at 20.)  
The remedial plan expressly covers probation officers.  An 
employee may ask for the disqualification of a judicial officer 
with prior involvement in the dispute by filing a written 
request with the Chief Judge (which will be decided by the 
next otherwise available active judge if the Chief Judge is 
named as involved in the dispute).  If the Chief Judge is 
disqualified or unavailable, this next available active judge 
will then serve as the reviewing officer.   In turn, where the 
employee alleges that an Article III judge has violated rights 
protected by the Consolidated Model Plan, this judge may 
elect to have a hearing conducted by a judicial officer from 
another court.  The employee (as well as the individuals 
alleged to have violated his or her rights and the unit 
executive in charge of the employing office) has the right to 
be represented by a person of his or her choice. 
 
After providing notice and an opportunity to respond, 
the respective judicial officer may dismiss in writing any 
complaint that the judge finds to be frivolous, unduly 
repetitive, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, or makes a claim that was not advanced in 
mediation.  If not, the judge ―shall hold a hearing on merits of 
the complaint unless he or she determines that no material 
factual dispute exists.‖  (Id. at 28.)  The presiding judicial 
officer may provide for discovery and investigation before 
any such hearing takes place.  ―At the hearing, the 
complainant, the unit executive of the office against which 
the complaint has been filed and the individual alleged to 
have violated rights protected by this Consolidated Model 
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Plan will have the rights to representation, to present evidence 
on his or her behalf, and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.‖  
(Id. at 29.)  A verbatim record of the hearing must be 
prepared, and the judicial officer must issue a final decision in 
writing.  ―The EDR/EEO Decisions Review Committee of the 
Third Circuit Judicial Council, on behalf of the Third Circuit 
Judicial Council, will review decisions of the hearing officer, 
when properly petitioned, . . . by a party or individual 
aggrieved by a final decision of the hearing officer or by a 
summary dismissal of the complaint.‖  (Id. at 31.)  ―Any 
review will be conducted by a judicial officer, based on the 
record created by the hearing officer, and shall be affirmed if 
supported by substantial evidence.‖  (Id. at 30.)  The review 
committee‘s decision must be in writing. 
 
The Consolidated Model Plan expressly provides for a 
number of different remedies, such as ―reinstatement to a 
position from which previously removed,‖ ―back pay and 
associated benefits, including attorneys‘ fees, where the 
statutory criteria of the Back Pay Act‖ are satisfied, ―records 
modification and/or expungement,‖ ―‗equitable‘ relief, such 
as temporary stays of adverse actions,‖ and ―appropriate 
action against a judicial officer or other individual found to 
have violated rights protected under this Consolidated Model 
Plan.‖  (Id. at 32.)  Retaliation against complainants and 
participants in the filing or processing of a complaint is 
expressly prohibited. 
 
The detailed remedial scheme adopted by the District 
Court clearly provides for both a measure of judicial review 
and the means to obtain meaningful relief to ―[a]n employee 
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covered under this Consolidated Model Plan who claims a 
denial of the rights granted hereunder.‖  (Id. at 20.)  Unlike 
their competitive service counterparts in Elgin (who only 
have a right to seek judicial review by the Federal Circuit of 
decisions rendered by the MSPB, see, e.g., Elgin, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2130-31), a District Court employee may obtain a hearing 
on the merits of his or her complaint before an actual judicial 
officer.  If this judicial officer rules against the employee, he 
or she then may seek review by a panel of other judicial 
officers, subject to the same substantial evidence standard 
applicable to the Federal Circuit‘s review of MSPB decisions.  
See, e.g., id.  Admittedly, the Consolidated Model Plan does 
expressly prohibit ―payment of attorneys‘ fees (except as 
authorized under the Back Pay Act).‖  (Id. at 33).  But it still 
authorizes the judicial officer to provide a wide range of other 
remedies to a successful complainant, such as back pay and 
associated benefits (including attorney‘s fees if authorized 
under the Back Pay Act), expungement of the record, and 
other forms of equitable relief.  Most importantly, the District 
Court‘s plan expressly provides for the remedy of 
reinstatement.  Cf., e.g., Bush, 462 U.S. at 372 & n.9 
(assuming that Bush‘s civil service remedies were not as 
effective as individual damages remedy and did not fully 
compensate him for harm suffered and observing that his 
attorney‘s fees were not paid). 
 
 The parties as well as the Court of Federal Claims and 
the District Court itself vigorously contest the applicability of 
the Consolidated Model Plan.  Semper also contends that the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Appellees from now taking 
the position that the District Court‘s remedial plan applies to 
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his claims.  In the end, we agree with the Appellees‘ own 
reading of the District Court‘s remedial plan—specifically 
that it ―covers plaintiff‘s claim that he was terminated without 
cause and in violation of his due process rights.‖  (Appellees‘ 
Brief at 36 (citation omitted).) 
 
 The Consolidated Model Plan includes the following 
―Coverage‖ language: 
 
 This Consolidated Model Plan addresses 
the following workplace and employment 
issues: 
 
(1) equal employment opportunity  
  and anti-discrimination rights; 
(2) sexual harassment; 
(3) personnel practices, including 
recruitment, hiring, promotion 
and advancement; 
(4) family and medical leave rights; 
(5) worker adjustment and retraining  
  notification rights; 
(6) employment and re-employment 
rights of members of the 
uniformed services; 
(7) occupational safety and health  
  protections; 
(8) polygraph tests; and 
(9) employee dispute resolution 
procedures for claims of the 
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denial of the rights afforded under 
this Consolidated Model Plan. 
 
(Appellees‘ Addendum at 8-9.)  The document then contains 
separate chapters addressing the various workplace and 
employment rights that it protects, i.e., ―Equal Employment 
Opportunity and Anti-Discrimination Rights‖ (Chapter 2), 
―Personnel Practices‖ (Chapter 3), ―Family and Medical 
Leave Rights‖ (Chapter 4), ―Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Rights‖ (Chapter 5), ―Employment 
and Reemployment Rights of Members of the Uniformed 
Services‖ (Chapter 6), ―Occupational Safety and Health 
Protections (Chapter 7), and ―Polygraph Tests‖ (Chapter 8).  
(Id. at 14-19 (emphasis omitted).)  Furthermore, ―[i]t is 
intended to be the exclusive remedy of the employee relating 
to rights enumerated under this Consolidated Model Plan.‖ 
(Id. at 9.)  Therefore, ―[a]n employee covered under this 
Consolidated Model Plan who claims a denial of the rights 
granted hereunder shall seek resolution of such claims 
through the procedures‖ established by the Consolidated 
Model Plan itself.  (Id. at 20.)  However, general employment 
dispute and personnel grievance procedures that do not 
―invoke the protections of this Consolidated Model Plan‖ also 
remain in effect.  (Id. at 9.)  In seeking relief, the employee is 
required to select either the Consolidated Model Plan or (if 
available) the general grievance and adverse action appeal 
procedures. 
   
According to Semper, the remedial plan does not 
protect or enumerate any employee rights with respect to 
termination unless the employee was terminated for 
 37 
discriminatory reasons or some other ground otherwise 
covered by the plan document itself (e.g., in retaliation for 
filing a complaint).  We acknowledge that Chapter 3, which 
governs ―Personnel Practices,‖ does not expressly refer to 
discharge or termination.  (Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted).)  
Likewise, the ―Coverage‖ section itself does not include 
termination in its enumeration of covered ―personnel 
practices.‖  (Id. at 8.)  Semper claims that the absence of any 
reference to termination is not surprising because most 
judicial employees are terminable at will.  Probation officers, 
however, have a statutory right to for-cause termination.  
Accordingly, the Judicial Conference has developed a ―Model 
Adverse Action Procedure for Removal of a Probation 
Officer.‖  Unlike the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, Dotson, 398 F.3d at 161, the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands has not adopted this 
specific plan. 
 
Although Semper does present a somewhat plausible 
reading of the Consolidated Model Plan, we nevertheless 
determine that the remedial plan adopted by the District Court 
―covers plaintiff‘s claim that he was terminated without cause 
and in violation of his due process rights.‖  (Appellees Brief 
at 36 (citation omitted).)  In other words, we believe that 
Semper, in essence, ―claims a denial of the rights granted 
[under the Consolidated Model Plan].‖  (Appellees‘ 
Addendum at 20.)  Intended to provide District Court 
employees with their exclusive remedy, the 29-page 
Consolidated Model Plan addresses at some length its 
purpose and scope, the various rights protected, the 
procedures to be followed by an employee who complains 
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that his or her rights have been violated, and the remedies 
available if judicial officers find that such rights have actually 
been infringed.  In turn, the remedial plan expansively 
―addresses‖ a number of ―workplace and employment 
issues,‖ specifically enumerated in nine distinct categories 
ranging from ―equal employment opportunity and anti-
discrimination rights‖ to ―employment dispute resolution 
procedures for claims of the denial of the rights afforded 
under this Consolidated Model Plan.‖  (Id. at 8-9.)  
Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims was incorrect when 
it stated that the District Court‘s remedial plan ―covers only 
equal employment opportunity and anti-discrimination 
rights.‖  Semper, 100 Fed. Cl. at 637 (citing Consolidated 
Model Plan).  In fact, the document actually lists ―personnel 
practices‖ as one of the ―workplace and employment issues‖ 
it is meant to address.  (Id. at 8.)  It then states that such 
practices ―include‖ recruitment, hiring, promotion, and 
advancement, indicating that additional ―personnel 
practices‖—like termination of employment—are 
encompassed under this rubric.  See, e.g., In re APA Transp. 
Corp. Consol. Litig., 541 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2008) (―It is 
a well-established canon of statutory construction that when 
the word ‗including is followed by a list of examples, those 
examples are generally considered illustrative rather than 
exhaustive.‘‖ (citations omitted)).  The Consolidated Model 
Plan also authorizes the judicial officer to order 
―reinstatement to a position from which [the complainant 
was] previously removed.‖  (Id. at 32.)  Obviously, an 
individual cannot be reinstated unless the employment 
relationship was terminated in some fashion.  Although (as 
Semper indicates) the reinstatement remedy may be available 
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where, for instance, an otherwise at-will employee was 
terminated for discriminatory reasons, we believe that the 
existence of this remedy—considered together with the other 
aspects of the expansive remedial plan adopted by the District 
Court for its own employees—weighs in favor of Appellees‘ 
reading.  We find it unlikely that such a comprehensive plan 
designed to protect the rights of employees would not cover 
probation officers who (unlike their co-workers) are protected 
from termination by a specific statutory provision. 
 
It is undisputed that Appellees did not specifically 
assert that the Consolidated Model Plan applies to Semper 
and his claims for relief before they filed their appellate brief 
with this Court.  In addition to claiming that Appellees 
thereby waived any argument that the District Court‘s 
remedial plan provides a remedy, Semper vigorously 
contends that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be 
applied to bar Appellees‘ ―gamesmanship‖ in 
opportunistically seizing on the District Court‘s incorrect 
characterization of the Consolidated Model Plan ―to now 
claim that [it] gave Officer Semper a remedy.‖  (Appellant‘s 
Reply Brief at 7 (emphasis omitted).)  In particular, he points 
to the following exchange that occurred at oral argument 
before the Federal Circuit between the Justice Department 
attorney and Judge O‘Malley: 
 
Q. ―Was there a mechanism for [Officer 
Semper] to challenge [his termination] within 
the Circuit?‖ 
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A. ―As far as I know, Mr. Semper is right, is 
that, the district court in the Virgin Islands has 
not adopted the specific adverse procedures 
with respect to pers__, um probation officers 
and I believe the regular employment dispute 
resolution procedures do not cover this situation 
so I, I I, don‘t believe there was an 
administrative remedy within this particular 
court.‖  
  
(Id. at 2 (quoting Recording at 18:35-19:05).)  The Justice 
Department attorney made a similar statement in response to 
a question by Judge Bryson asking ―‗[h]ow does that person 
enforce the ‗for cause‘ entitlement, other than by moral 
suasion‘‖:  ―‗I‘m not sure that he can.  I‘m not sure that there 
is a judicial remedy.‘‖  (Id. at 16 (quoting Recording at 16:55-
17:22).) 
 
 ―Judicial estoppel is a fact-specific, equitable doctrine, 
applied at courts‘ discretion.‖  In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 638 
(3d Cir. 2010).  It rests on the basic notion that, ―‗absent any 
good explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain an 
advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an 
inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible theory.‘‖  
Id. (quoting Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 214, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2003)); see 
also, e.g., id. (noting that several criteria guide application of 
judicial estoppel doctrine, i.e., whether two positions are 
irreconcilably inconsistent, whether the party changed 
position in bad faith, whether relief is tailored to address harm 
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and no lesser sanction would suffice as remedy, and whether 
party is provided with opportunity to offer explanation). 
 
We are troubled by the manner in which the Justice 
Department has addressed the applicability of the District 
Court‘s remedial plan, and we are especially concerned about 
the statements made at oral argument before the Federal 
Circuit.  Under the circumstances, one could reasonably 
conclude that Semper is the victim of the proverbial ―run 
around‖ in his ongoing attempt to have his constitutional 
claims heard on their merits and obtain some sort of relief—
from the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit to 
the District Court and this Court and, finally, to the remedial 
process adopted by the District Court. 
 
Nevertheless, we do not believe that it is appropriate to 
apply this fact-specific and equitable doctrine in the present 
circumstances. 
 
 Initially, Appellees appropriately note that judicial 
estoppel cannot be used to create subject matter jurisdiction.  
See, e.g., Erie Ins. Exch. v. Erie Indemn. Co., 722 F.3d 154, 
162-63 (3d Cir. 2013).  Likewise, such jurisdictional defects 
may be raised at any time (and, in fact, must be raised sua 
sponte).  See, e.g., Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 
399 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008).  The question of whether or not the 
CSRA bars a federal employee from challenging an adverse 
employment action in an action filed pursuant to § 1331 
represents a threshold jurisdictional determination.  See, e.g., 
Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132 (―We granted certiorari to decide 
whether the CSRA precludes district court jurisdiction over 
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petitioners‘ claims even though they are constitutional claims 
for equitable relief.  We conclude that it does, and we 
therefore affirm.‖ (citations omitted)); Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 
797 (―For these reasons, we hold that the District Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Sarullo‘s Bivens 
claim as such a claim was barred by the comprehensive 
statutory scheme provided in the CSRA, and should have 
dismissed the Bivens claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.‖).  In this appeal, we must determine whether the 
CSRA precludes Semper‘s constitutional claims for equitable 
and injunctive relief, and our determination rests on whether 
he could pursue meaningful relief under a remedial plan that 
provides for meaningful review of his claims by judicial 
officers.  Accordingly, this jurisdictional inquiry implicates 
more than (in Semper‘s terms) ―‗prudential exhaustion.‘‖  
(Appellant‘s Reply Brief at 10 n.8 (citation omitted).) 
 
We further note that it was Semper himself who 
insisted (and continues to insist) that the Consolidated Model 
Plan does not apply in the present circumstances.  According 
to Semper, the government successfully argued before the 
Federal Circuit that the CSRA provides the exclusive remedy 
and thereby necessarily conceded that the Consolidated 
Model Plan does not apply in the current circumstances.  In 
short, ―[i]f the [Consolidated Model Plan] had provided 
Officer Semper with a remedy, the task of dismissing Officer 
Semper‘s complaint in the Court of Federal Claims would 
have been easy – simply move to dismiss based upon the 
exclusive remedy provided by the [Consolidated Model 
Plan].‖  (Appellant‘s Reply Brief at 40.)  He nevertheless fails 
to cite to any case in which a § 1331 action was dismissed 
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simply because a court (or a federal agency) had established 
its own administrative remedies for employment disputes.  In 
Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 1997), abrogated on 
other grounds, Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 
(8th Cir. 2011) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit specifically 
determined that a district court‘s adoption of an equal 
employment opportunity plan did not prevent an unsuccessful 
applicant from bringing a Bivens damages claim for reverse 
discrimination in the selection of a new chief probation 
officer, id. at 1034-35.  Significantly, ―[i]t appears that the 
defendants in Duffy never suggested that the CSRA 
preempted plaintiff‘s claim.‖  Lee, 145 F.3d at 1276 n.4.  The 
Second Circuit in Dotson more recently concluded that the 
CSRA barred the former probation officer‘s discrimination 
and due process claims because of, among other things, ―the 
existence of the judiciary‘s own administrative review 
procedures for employment disputes.‖   Dotson, 398 F.3d at 
160.  In addition, the Federal Circuit considered Semper‘s 
argument that ―the government‘s contention that the CSRA 
forecloses actions by Judicial Branch employees in the Court 
of Federal Claims challenging adverse agency actions of the 
type covered by the CSRA would invalidate internal 
administrative remedies devised by Judicial Branch agencies 
to deal with their employees‘ employment-related 
complaints.‖  Semper, 694 F.3d at 94 n.2.  The Federal 
Circuit expressly rejected this argument, observing that 
Congress‘s decision to foreclose excepted service employees 
from challenging adverse employment actions in actions filed 
with the Court of Federal Claims does not in any way suggest 
that Congress intended to bar either the Judicial or the 
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Executive Branch from devising their own administrative 
remedies.  Id. 
 
Furthermore, we believe that Semper asks us to accord 
too much weight to the Court of Federal Claims‘s 
characterization of the Consolidated Model Plan.  ―[J]udicial 
estoppel is generally not appropriate where the defending 
party did not convince the [court] to accept its earlier 
position.‖   G-Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 
247, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Pelullo, 399 
F.3d 197, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2005); Dam Things from Denmark 
v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 599 n.16 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Montrose Med. Group v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 
2001)).  The Court of Federal Claims rejected the 
government‘s theory that CSRA foreclosed Semper from 
seeking relief in the Court of Federal Claims.  Semper, 100 
Fed. Cl. at 626-33.  ―[T]he court concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction over his claim because he failed to point to any 
money-mandating statute or regulation that would give him a 
right to contest his termination before that court.‖  Semper, 
694 F.3d at 92.  It accordingly considered the Consolidated 
Model Plan (and other remedial schemes that have not been 
adopted by the District Court) as part of this money-
mandating statute inquiry, and it concluded that ―[s]imply 
because the District Court of the Virgin Islands has not 
adopted the model procedures does not give plaintiff a cause 
of action in this court or in any other federal court.‖  Semper, 
100 Fed. Cl. at 638.  While the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of Semper‘s complaint based on the CSRA theory 
originally advanced by the government, it did not specifically 
discuss the applicability of the Consolidated Model Plan.  In 
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fact, the only time it really addressed the judiciary‘s remedial 
plans was in the context of rejecting Semper‘s own theory 
that the government‘s approach would invalidate any 
administrative remedies devised by the judiciary.  Semper, 
694 F.3d at 94 n.2. 
 
In conclusion, we determine that the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
Semper‘s constitutional claims for equitable and declaratory 
relief.  We accordingly will affirm the District Court‘s 
dismissal of Count Two (Semper‘s official capacity claim 
against then-Chief Judge Gomez) and Count Three (his claim 
against the United States) for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  We likewise conclude that Count One (Semper‘s 
claim against then-Chief Judge Gomez named in his 
individual capacity) must be dismissed on the same grounds.
6
  
See, e.g., Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 797 (concluding that district 
court should have dismissed Bivens claim for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction).  Semper asks us to refer this matter to the 
Third Circuit Judicial Council to fashion a remedy for him if 
we ultimately affirm the decision of the District Court.  Such 
a step appears unnecessary at this time given our conclusion 
                                                 
 
6
 Because of our jurisdictional ruling, we need 
not—and do not—determine whether the District Court 
properly concluded that Count One failed to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  We likewise need not—and do—not 
reach the question of whether the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands constitutes an ―agency‖ for purposes of the APA (in 
other words, whether it should be considered as either a court 
of the United States or as part of a territorial government).    
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that, in the Appellees‘ own words, the Consolidated Model 
Plan does ―cover plaintiff‘s claim that he was terminated 
without cause and in violation of his due process rights.‖  
(Appellees‘ Brief at 36 (citations omitted).)  In turn, our 
disposition of this appeal is premised on the expectation that 
Appellees will continue to abide by—and defend—their 
current reading of the Consolidated Model Plan (a reading 
that they once again reiterate in a letter submitted following 
oral argument) if Semper decides to pursue relief under the 
Consolidated Model Plan itself.  We also note that the 
Consolidated Model Plan expressly authorizes the judicial 
officer to grant extensions of time, i.e., ―[t]he chief judge of 
the court, or other presiding judicial officer, may extend any 
of the deadlines set forth in this Consolidated Model Plan for 
good cause.‖  (Appellees‘ Addendum at 21.) 
 
B. Semper’s Mandamus Claim 
 
 In Count Four, Semper sought mandamus relief 
against then-Chief Judge Gomez on the grounds that he ―has 
a clear right to be employed as a probation officer until such 
time as he is found, after notice and an opportunity to [be] 
heard, that there is cause to terminate him‖ and that Chief 
Judge Gomez ―has a clear legal duty to continue to employ 
Officer Semper until such time as Officer Semper is given 
notice and a pre-termination hearing as to the basis for the 
claim that there is a cause to dismiss him.‖  (A32.)  The 
Mandamus Act provides that ―[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus 
to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any 
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agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.‖  28 
U.S.C. § 1361.   
 
Semper recognizes that the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands does not constitute an ―agency‖ for purposes of this 
statutory provision.  Relying on the doctrine of judicial 
immunity as well as the Tenth Circuit‘s ruling in Trackwell v. 
United States Government, 472 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2007), 
he goes on to claim that a judge or judicial employee 
constitutes ―an officer or employee of the United States,‖ at 
least with respect to non-judicial administrative duties.  
However, as the Second Circuit explained in Liberation News 
Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir. 1970), it appears 
that Congress, in enacting § 1361 (and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), a 
related venue provision), ―was thinking solely in terms of the 
executive branch,‘‖ Eastland, 426 F.2d at 1384.  ―Relying on 
Eastland, two other circuit courts have held that § 1391(e) 
does not apply to defendants affiliated with the judicial 
branch.‖  Trackwell, 472 F.3d at 1246 (citing King v. Russell, 
963 F.2d 1301, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1992); Duplantier v. United 
States, 606 F.2d 654, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1979)).  The Trackwell 
court concluded that a district court lacked jurisdiction over a 
mandamus claim against the Clerk of the United States 
Supreme Court because, while the office of the Clerk is not 
the Supreme Court itself, the plaintiff was asking him to 
perform a judicial function delegated by the Supreme Court 
itself, i.e., the filing of an application (and, in the judicial 
immunity context, a court clerk who assists a court or a judge 
in the discharge of judicial functions is considered to be the 
functional equivalent of the judge).  Id. at 1247.  Likewise, 
we do not believe that it would be appropriate for the District 
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Court of the Virgin Islands to issue a writ of mandamus 
against its own Chief Judge, ―ordering him to reinstate Mr. 
Semper to his position as probation officer, retroactive to 
August 6, 2010, until ordering that he may not terminate 
Officer Semper without first providing him with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard as to the basis for any such 
termination‖ (A32).  See, e.g., id. at 1246 (―For a district 
court to issue a writ of mandamus against an equal or higher 
court would be remarkable.‖); Semper, 2013 WL 2451711, at 
*6 (―Although a higher court has power to grant a writ of 
mandamus against a lower court, the district court has no 
power to issue the writ against its judicial officers or the 
federal courts.‖ (citing Smith v. Kriegh, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1274 
(D. Colo. 2009); 28 U.S.C. § 1651).  It is not surprising that 
Semper himself has failed to cite to any decision allowing 
such an unusual claim to go forward. 
 
We therefore conclude that the District Court properly 
dismissed Count Four on jurisdictional grounds.  In any 
event, a writ of mandamus also represents an extraordinary 
remedy.  See, e.g., Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 934 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (―‗It is not disputed that the remedy of mandamus 
is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary 
situations.‘‖ (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 
449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (footnote omitted)).   Specifically, 
―[t]he common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 
U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff 
only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief.‖  Heckler 
v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984) (citing Kerr v. U.S. Dist. 
Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1976); United States ex rel. Girard 
Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543-44 (1937)); see 
 49 
also, e.g., Stehney, 101 F.3d at 934 n.6.  As we have 
explained in some detail, Semper could pursue meaningful 
relief under the Consolidated Model Plan adopted by the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands.  Accordingly, we do not 
believe that the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus 
would be appropriate in the present circumstances. 
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court insofar as it dismissed Counts Two, Three, 
and Four of Semper‘s amended complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  In addition, we will remand this matter to 
the District Court with instructions to dismiss Count One of 
the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
